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This document is comprised of draft sample pages from the new naval wargame rules by Rich Sartore and Jack Joyner.

- 1. Rulebook Foreword and Introduction
- 2. Example pages from the Scenarios (Volume I) with sample ship logs
- 3. Example Pages from the Flag Officer's Handbook

RULEBOOK & GAME CHARTS: available in both print and downloadable PDF


SCENARIOS VOLUME I: available as PDF download only and includes all ship logs to play the scenarios

FLAG OFFICER'S HANDBOOK: available as PDF download only (includes a printable PDF version of the Signal Card Deck)


SIGNAL CARD DECK: available in print version only (67 cards - US poker-size on premium coated card stock)

All items now available from WARGAME VAULT.






RULEBOOK



SCENARIOS - VOLUME I



FLAG OFFICER'S HANDBOOK

FLEET ACTIONS 1880-1945

INTRODUCTION SO YOU THINK YOU CAN COMMAND A FLEET?

We issue the above challenge to all naval wargamers right up front. primarily because most naval wargames are focused on players acting as all-seeing captains of a handful of ships, usually permitted to move them about the game table without limitation. While this approach is enjoyable and typically works well for re-enacting smaller battles like River Plate. Denmark Strait and others, it simply doesn't represent the way it happened in real life. Successfully commanding squadrons and divisions of warships in battle required control and skilled communication from a single source; the admiral of the fleet.

"Signals travel alone...and have to be carefully worded to be readily understood. They carry the authority of a ship or squadron. They are paid for with reputations, sometimes even with human lives.'

> Captain Jack Broome, RN From Make a Signal, 1955.

For example, at the Battle of Dogger Bank, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, determined to complete the destruction of the German 1st Scouting Group, issued signals to direct his forces to continue the pursuit that his badly damaged flagship, HMS LION could no longer lead. Intending to direct his forces to close with the fleeing enemy formation, signals were raised to indicate "Course NE. Attack the rear of the enemy.", but were interpreted to mean "Attack the rear of the enemy bearing NE". This lead Beatty's ships to concentrate on the already-doomed SMS BLUCHER, allowing Admiral Franz von Hipper's remaining forces to escape. Without the rules that simulate signaling, this kind of incident can never occur.

Simulating this in a game is certainly a challenge for both the game designer and players, but it is something we sincerely believe is one aspect of fleet engagements long in need of attention. As well-read students of naval history will agree, the difficulties inherent in commanding, maneuvering and fighting large numbers of warships and dealing with the unexpected as well, are the ultimate test of any would-be admiral. Across the five decades of our involvement in playing and designing naval wargames, this has never been seriously addressed in any game system, including SEEKRIEG. We felt that it was time to rectify this by writing ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET with a card-based command and signaling system that is readily adaptable to any other naval gaming system.

The years of research and development that culminated in the publication of SEEKRIEG 5 in 2004 have allowed us to design a new set of rules that, while continuing to accurately reflect important aspects of naval combat such as fire control, armor and penetration and the effects of damage, allow even the largest of naval battles to be re-fought in a single afternoon or evening of play. And, like its predecessor, the broad time period covered by AOTF (1880 to 1945) reflects the ability of the system to accurately deal with the entire era in a single set of rules. This is particularly true of the individual Ship Logs which have been crafted not only to replicate the capabilities of each ship but allow damage more specific to the time period and, in some cases, the ship itself.

AOTF focuses exclusively on surface warfare during the age of the battleship. This was a conscious decision on our part, based on the popularity of surface-only engagements and the difficulties inherent in an accurate portrayal of the additional dimensions required by the addition of aircraft and submarines to the game table. Introducing signaling as a major component of the game was a natural evolution in our design philosophy. While gamers and even some historians tend to think that the "proper" outcome of any wargame is a repetition of the historical outcome, this assumes that the historic result is at the middle of the possible spectrum of outcomes, rather than the extremes. Thus, our design philosophy has always utilized the guardrails provided by individual ship capabilities, thorough research and appropriate application of probability which permits the possible to happen, regardless of the historic outcome.

Good game design strikes a balance between accurately simulating pivotal aspects of naval wargaming and an enjoyable level of playability. While an exhaustive, comprehensive re-creation of signaling systems would be unmanageable, our rules are focused on providing a workable subset of fundamental signals that can be used to add this long-ignored aspect to naval warfare scenarios. However, these simplifications do mean that, by design, some signals can be interpreted in more than one way.

As we have often found to be the case, there is no simple, single correct answer to many questions that arise during a game since the resolution may depend entirely on the situation. We urge players and judges alike to follow the spirit of naval warfare rather than the letter of rules if an odd situation should arise during play. In other words, let the rules work as they were intended and play the game as an admiral or captain truly would; by using tactics and strategy to achieve your victory rather that attempting to gain advantage by exploiting a perceived flaw in the system.

Above all, we sincerely hope you and your gaming partners will find AOTF to be an enjoyable experience in all respects. Although the signaling system will initially present a challenge to some, rest assured that you will, in time, enjoy the satisfaction that comes from having mastered the system after commanding your fleet to victory. That is something only the great admirals of naval history have experienced.

Good luck and Equal Speed Charlie London!

Richard R. Sartore and Jack L Joyner







FLEET ACTIONS 1880-1945

FOREWORD

by JOHN BROOKS

In writing *The Battle of Jutland* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), I soon became convinced that the signals made during the action were indispensable to its understanding. Thus, in the finished book, the account of every major episode is accompanied by tabulations of the opposing sides' signals. I therefore applaud the appearance of *Admiral of the Fleet*, the new naval war game by Rich Sartore and Jack Joyner, with its emphasis on command and control using a system of signal cards.

The inspiration for this system has been the Royal Navy's *General Signal Book 1915*. However, this ran to nearly 400 pages and was intended to cover a wide range of eventualities; further, to keep signals as brief as possible, it depended on a large number of laconic signal codes that had to be mastered by specialist signal officers and ratings. Fortunately, however, the actual subset of signals employed in the actions of World War I was quite small, so the authors have been able to design a Signal Deck for *Admiral of the Fleet* that is compact and expresses the elements of each signal in at most a few words. Thus players do not need to grapple with signal codes; instead, signals are composed as short sequences of signal cards which have the same 'purport' as actual action signals. Importantly, this means that players are constrained to manoeuvre individual ships or larger divisions only by the same orders that were available to commanders in the battleship era.

This realism will doubtless challenge players and add to the fascination of the game. Perhaps, too, it will allow them to explore realistically some interesting might-have-beens: for example, whether the Run to the South at Jutland might have ended differently if Beatty had formed his line sooner; or whether divided tactics might have produced more decisive outcomes. *Admiral of the Fleet* will surely offer opportunities for enjoyable game play in scenarios both historical and imagined.

John Brooks Harpenden, Herts. UK October, 2021





After a career in computing and telecommunications, John Brooks obtained his doctorate from the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Now an independent scholar, he is the author of *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control* (2005) and *The Battle of Jutland* (2016).



THE BATTLE OF CRETE APRIL 12, 1898

Scenario Background

The island of Crete became an Ottoman province in 1669, after the Siege of Candia (modern-day Heraklion), claimed by some historians to be the longest siege in history. The end of four centuries of Venetian rule resulted in decades of Muslim-Christian conflict, characterized by assassinations of religious and political leaders and massacres of the civilian populace, in some instances the inhabitants of entire cities.



Greece succeeded in securing its independence from the Ottoman Empire in a conflict that was fought between 1821 and 1829. The Greeks were assisted by Great Britain, France and Russia; each sent naval squadron in 1827, intercepting and defeating the Ottoman–Egyptian fleet at Navarino. In 1828, a French expeditionary force forced the Egyptian army to withdraw, and Russia invaded the Ottoman Empire forcing it to accept Greek autonomy in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. These and other failures in Ottoman hegemony led to the empire's characterization as the "sick man of Europe" a phrase Tsar Nicholas I of Russia is credited for coining.

Crete took part in the Greek War of Independence, but the uprising was suppressed and the island remained under Egyptian control until 1840, when it was restored to full Ottoman authority. Following the Cretan Revolt during the years of 1866–1869 and successive unrest, the island received significant autonomy, but the 1895 massacre of Armenians in Anatolia shocked international public opinion and Ottoman violations of the autonomy statutes and Cretan aspirations for eventual union with the Kingdom of Greece led to the Cretan Revolt of 1897–1898 and the Greco-Turkish War of 1897.

Faced with the Cretan problem, the European powers had three potential solutions: the restoration of Turkish authority, the union of Crete with Greece (a solution favored by public opinion and the European press) or autonomy, a solution first formulated by the Great Britain. On March 15, 1897 the European powers sent Greece their proposal for autonomy for the island. Though the Greek government categorically refused, on March 20, the powers declared the autonomy of Crete, placed under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and, with their fleets, blockaded the island beginning March 21.

As part of this effort an International Squadron was formed which operated in Cretan waters from February 1897 to December 1898. The senior admiral from each of the Great Powers became a member of an "Admirals Council", tasked with managing the affairs of the island. Initially led by Vice Admiral Felice Napoleone Canevaro of Italy, the Council was additionally comprised of:

- Kontreadmiral Johann Edler von Hinke of Austria-Hungary, Deputy Council Chairman;
- Rear Admiral Édouard Pottier of France (who later replaced Canevaro as Council Chairman)
- Korvettenkapitän Hans Otto Koellner of Germany
- Rear Admiral Sir Robert Hastings Penruddock Harris of Great Britain, and;
- Rear Admiral P. P. Andreev of Russia.


THE GREAT POWERS INTERVENE



The Great Powers (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia) continued to have political interests and exerted their influence on the island of Crete. In 1897, when the Cretan Revolt led the Ottoman Empire to declare war on Greece, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia intervened on the grounds that the Ottoman Empire could no longer maintain control and that continued conflict might lead to a greater war in Europe.

SCENARIOS VOLUME I 13


ORDER OF BATTLE



BRITISH SQUADRON

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

REAR ADMIRAL
GERARD H. U. NOEL



British Flagship Revenge

Royal Navy	White	Ensign

Battle Division					
SHIP	CLASS				
Revenge (F) Captain Charles John Briggs	Royal Sovereign				
Barfleur	Centurion				
Captain Reginald Neville Custance	Ochlanon				
Camperdown Captain Robert William Craigie	Admiral 2				
Hood Captain Arthur C. B. Bromlev	Hood				

Cruiser Division				
Astraea (F) Captain Henry Deacon Barry	Astraea			
Venus Captain Archibald Berkeley Milne	Eclipse			
Isis Captain Henry Hart Dyke	Eclipse			



French Navy Ensign

FRENCH SQUADRON

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

CONTRE-AMIRAL EDOUARD POTTIER



French Flagship Jaureguiberry

Battle Division					
SHIP	CLASS				
Jaureguiberry (F) Capitaine Xavier André Foret	Jaureguiberry				
Charles Martel Capitaine Charles T. R. Rouvier	Charles Martel				
Carnot Capitaine Edmond Baptistin Ravel	Carnot				
Brennus Capitaine Eugène Louis Gadaud	Brennus				

Cruiser Division					
Pothuau					
Amiral Charner					
Amiral Charner					
Amiral Charner					
1					

SCENARIOS VOLUME I 18

FLEET ACTIONS 1880-1945

By 0500, it was clear to the Russians that they had been discovered and were being shadowed.

At 0634, the forty vessels of the Japanese fleet sortied with Togo's flagship Mikasa in the lead. Wireless reports from shadowing cruisers allowed the Japanese to close to sighting distance by 1340. Japanese cruisers and destroyers had shadowed the Russian formation aggressively and raised fear that mines would be laid across the formations line of advance. Frustrated with Rozhestvensky's inaction against enemy units within range, battleship Orel opened fire with her six-inch battery on her own authority with other units in range joining based on the assumption that a signal had been given to commence the attack. A cease fire signal from Suvarov followed by "Do not waste ammunition" against units out of effective range. The crews were sent to dinner, convinced they driven the frightened enemy away.

With re-appearance of the shadowing Japanese cruisers, Rozhestvensky issued the first of two orders that impacted the overall effectiveness of his entire formation, signaling his 1st Division move to a line-abreast formation to maximize fire from their forward batteries. The ensuing confusion caused the order to be rescinded and the Russian fleet to resume a formation of two columns in line-ahead with the 1st Division led by Suvarov and the newer units in the starboard column and slightly in advance of the older units of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions to port. The confused Russian formation was on a course roughly north-northeast when Togo's main battleline was sighted.

The Japanese formation had approached from a northeasterly direction which appeared to be advantageous to the Russian fleet as Rozhestvensky's signals had somehow ensured that the Suvarov and her more modern sisters would lead the attack. Togo's forces were primarily arrayed in a single line-ahead formation, four battleships in the van followed by the 2nd Division's armored cruisers. After determining the weakness in the disposition of the Russian formation, Togo ordered a course change to starboard to "cross the T" of the enemy forces while still out of effective range of most of the enemy units.

Togo held fire while completing the action, choosing to order targeting after his



Signal Flag Zulu

maneuvers were complete. Suvarov opened fire on at 1349 at a range of 6400 yards scoring the first of 15 hits in Mikasa received in the first five minutes of combat. Russian fire was initially surprisingly good, but became poorer as fatigue and inexperience took their toll. After completing his initial movement, Togo ordered a 180° turn to starboard and continued to parallel the Russian formation.

At approximately 1355, Togo ordered the hoisting of the Z flag, issuing a preplanned signal to the entire fleet: "The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty." The signal was a reflection of the seven years Togo studied naval tactics in Great Britain as well as his admiration for the achievements of Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson. Finally, orders were signaled to open fire, with Mikasa and the three other 1st Division battleships concentrating on Suvarov with Oslyabya the target of the heavy cruisers. The disposition of the Russian formation and Togo's maneuvers prevented most of the 2nd Division from taking any real part in the early part of the battle and limited the participation of Suvarov's sisters.



Signal XGE: Surrender

Japanese fire eventually took its toll and at 1415, Mikasa scored a hit on Suvarov that started a serious fire that typified the effect that Japanese use of high-explosive shells filled

with Shimosa explosive had during the entire battle. Oslyabya was the

first Russian ship to succumb sinking roughly 90 minutes after the battle began. A direct hit by Fuji ignited Borodino's magazines and she sank with all hands. In addition, Suvarov and Imperator Aleksandr III were lost during the daylight portion of the battle. Four Japanese ships were damaged, but none were lost.

Владимир Иосифович Бэр



THE CAPTAIN WHO BECAME AN ADMIRAL IN AN AFTERNOON

Following the death of Admiral Dmitry von Fölkersahm on May 24, Rozhestvensky appointed the captain of Fölkersahm's flagship, *Oslyabya*, Vladimir Iosifovich Baer, to command the Second Division.

Born on November 12, 1853 in Yelnya, he joined the naval service in 1871 and rose through the ranks, eventually attaining the rank of Captain 1st Class in April of 1899. On May 17, 1904 he was appointed to command *Oslyabya*.

Reportedly very brave, he was also something of a martinet, having been brought before the naval court of Kronstadt in December 1894 for misdemeanors stipulated by the naval code on punishments. Later, he refused a promotion to Rear-Admiral in order to remain captain of the *Oslyabya*.

While there is no official record of a promotion and Fölkersahm's flag still flew on *Oslyabya* during the battle, there is no question that Captain Baer was commanding the Second Division at the Battle of Tsushima. He died along with many others of the battleship's crew, refusing to leave the bridge.

TSUSHIMA 2



Российский императорский флот

RUSSIAN FLEET

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

VICE-ADMIRAL ZINOVY ROZHESTVENSKY

Зиновий Петрович Рожественский



Russian Flagship Suvorov

BATTLE F	LEET
First Divi	sion
Vice-Admiral Zinovy	Rozhestvensky
SHIP	CLASS
Suvorov (F) Captain Vasily V. Ignatsius	Borodino
Imperator Aleksandr III Captain Nikolai M. Bukhvostov	Borodino
Borodino Captain Petr I. Serebrennikov	Borodino
Orel Captain Nikolai V. Jung	Borodino
Second Di	vision
Captain Vladii	mir I. Bir
Oslyabya (F) Captain Vladimir I. Bir	Peresviet
Sissoi Veliky Captain Mikhail V. Oserov	Sissoi Veliky
Navarin	Mayarin

Navarin Captain Baron B.A. Fitingof

Admiral Nakhimov Admiral Nakhimov

> Third Division Rear-Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov

Imperator Nikolai I (F) Imperator Aleksandr II Captain V. V. Smirnov Gen. Adm. Graf Apraksin Admiral Ushakov Captain N. G. Liwin Admiral Seniavin Admiral Ushakov Captain S. J. Grogoryev Admiral Ushakov

Admiral Ushakov Captain V.N. Miklukha-Maklai

Attached Cruisers Zhemchug Izumrud Izumrud Izumrud First Cruiser Division Rear-Admiral Oskar Enkvist

Oleg (F) Bogatyr Aurora Pallada Dmitri Donskoi Dmitri Donskoi Vladimir Monomakh Vladimir Monomakh

Second Scouting Division

Svetlana Svetlana Ural AMC

First Destroyer Division						
Byedovi	Boiki					
Buini	Boiki					
Bravi	Boiki					
Buistri	Boiki					
Second Destroyer Division						
Blestyashtchi	Boiki					
Rezunrechni	Boiki					

Bodri Boiki Gromki Boiki Grozni Boiki

Kostroma

Transport Squadron (Auxiliaries) Almaz Armed Yacht Anadyr Transport Transport Irtuish Kamchatka Repair Ship Koreya Ammunition Ship Rus Fleet Tug Svir Fleet Tug Orel Hospital Ship Hospital Ship



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1902 to 1910

DIRECTORS

32.0"

2

Range

Displacement Complement Launched Completed


12,530 ts 652 03/31/1896 Beam 08/17/1897 Draft

SHIP LOG SHEET Length 390 ft 73 ft

26.5 ft

Version AOTFTest060921





GUNNERY (FCS)						
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MEDIUM		LONG	
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR
0-9	12	7	7	4	5	3
10-18	8	5	5	3	3	2
19-26	6	4	4	2	3	2
27-32	5	3	3	2	2	1

56%	PENETRATION TABLE					
AP	SHORT		MEDIUM	LONG		
YDS	2,500 6,000		12,000	16,000		
ROF	2	2	2	2		
HORZ	0	1	1	2		
VERT	14	11	7	5		



GUNNERY (FCS)						
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MED	MEDIUM		NG
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR
0-9	7	4	4	3	3	2
10-18	5	3	3	2	2	1
19-26	4	2	2	1	2	1
27-32	3	2	2	1	1	1

	22%	PENETRATION TABLE					
	AP	SHORT		MEDIUM	LONG		
ſ	YDS	2,000 4,000		8,000	10,000		
ſ	ROF	7	6	4	3		
ſ	HORZ	0	0	0	1		
	VERT	5	4	3	2		



	Т		T	TORPEDOES				
	1		TT	5	RL	10		
				18" N	∕lk V*			
_		_	Dan	nage C	lass	Н		
2		3		Sett	ings			
				2,000/26				
4		5		3,000/21				
				4,00	0/18			

	LOSS OF SPEED DURING TURNS																		
KTS	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40
STD	3	5	6.	8	9	10	12	13	15	16	18	19	21	22	24	26	27	28	30
EMG	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

				Gl	JNN	IER	Y	REC	ORD					
T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	ŀ	1		T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	ŀ	1

Targ	Sz	Crew	S	ea		PROTECTION					HIT LOCATION				
1						ARMOR VALUE						RANGE	HORZ	VERT	
Sear	Searchlights Port Stbd				1	HORIZONTAL 2				SHORT	01-05	06-00			
Oour	ormg	IIIO F	nt c	JIDU		VERTICAL 9				MEDIUM	01-19	20-00			
14	14 7 DAMAGE CONTROL (DCR)								LONG	01-39	40-00				
		П									Ĺ	1			

FL	AG	CC	MI	1AN	ND	RA'	TIN	G (I	FCF	₹)

PD-01-2

			PD-01-2
	DAMAGE	DETERMINATION	N .
ROLL	CLASS 1	CLASS 2	CLASS 3
01-02	100	202	304
03-04	128	201	302
05-06	102	203	303
07-08	103	205	301
09-10	109	210	305
11-13	104	200	306
14-16	106	204	307
17-19	107	206	308
20-22	105	207	310
23-25	110	211	311
26-28	112	213	312
29-31	121	214	313
32-34	144	215	314
35-37	171	217	315
38-40	122	218	316
41-43	135	219	317
44-46	132	220	318
47-49	145	221	-
50-52	123	222	-
53-55	124	223	316
56-58	125	224	-
59-61	127	226	317
62-64	141	227	-
65-67	133	229	318
68-70	126	230	-
71-73	118	231	-
74-76	116	237	-
77-79	115	238	-
80-83	108	208	311
84-87	113	212	310
88-91	129	248	307
92-95	148	244	308
96-98	167	242	-
99-00	101	241	-


T#	RANGE	TARGET	TORPS	ANG	TGT MOVE	ARRIVE

FLOTILLA LOG SHEET





RUSSIA





Blucher **GERMANY** CA

2653-1 BLUCHER Class

1913 to 1915

Displacement Complement Launched Completed

15,600 ts 1026 04/11/1908 03/24/1909

Length Beam Draft

SHIP LOG SHEET

529 ft

80 ft

26.2 ft

Good sea boat with slight pitch but severe roll, though gentle motion. Slow into the turn with up to 55% speed loss with hard rudder.

Version AOTF-Test060221



CATION


1-05 06-00

1-19 20-00

1-39 40-00

VERT


IORZ





GUNNERY (FCS)									
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MED	NUIC	LONG				
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR			
0-9	16	10	12	7	9	6			
10-18	11	7	8	5	7	4			
19-26	9	6	7	4	5	3			
27-32	8	5	6	4	5	3			

34%	Р	PENETRATION TABLE								
APC	SH	ORT	MEDIUM	LONG						
YDS	2,000	6,000	12,000	20,500						
ROF	7	6	4	2						
HORZ	0	0	1	2						
VERT	11	8	4	3						



	GUN	INE	RY (FCS)	
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MED	NUI	LONG	
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR
0-9	13	8	9	6	7	5
10-18	9	6	6	4	5	З
19-26	7	5	5	3	4	З
27-32	6	4	4	3	4	2

TORPEDOES TT 4 RL 11

45cm C/03 D

Damage Class G

Settings

2,000/31

4,000/26

22%	Р	ENETRA	TION TAE	BLE
APC	SH	ORT	MEDIUM	LONG
YDS	2,500	6,000	10,000	16,000
ROF	7	6	4	3
HORZ	0	0	0	1
VERT	7	5	3	2

В

Р



Speed	00-03 kt	04-16 kt	17-19 kt	20+ kt	
Increase	4.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	

6

10 12

8 9 10 12 13 15 16 18

6. EMG NA NA NA NA

KTS

STD 3 5

		<u> </u>	J					
TUF	RNS							
26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40	
19	21	22	24	26	27	28	30	

13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |

s

	GUNNERY RECORD													
T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	ŀ	Н		T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	ŀ	Н

LOSS OF SPEED DURING

16 18 20 22 24

8 9 10 11 12

Targ S	Sz C	rew	5	Sea	F	PROTECTION				HIT	LC
2					Δ	RMOR		RANGE	Н		
Sparc	Searchlights Port Stbd			Н	ORIZONTA	٩L	2		SHORT	0.	
Couro				,	VERTICAL 5				MEDIUM	0,	
16 8 DAMAGE CONTROL (DCR)								LONG	01		

FL	AG	CC	MIC	1AN	ND	RA'	TIN	G (I	FCF	₹)

W1-01-2

			W1-01-2
	DAMAGE	DETERMINATION	١
ROLL	CLASS 1	CLASS 2	CLASS 3
01-02	100	202	304
03-04	128	201	302
05-06	102	203	303
07-08	103	205	301
09-10	109	210	305
11-13	104	200	306
14-16	106	204	307
17-19	107	206	308
20-22	105	207	310
23-25	110	211	311
26-28	112	213	312
29-31	121	214	313
32-34	144	215	314
35-37	171	217	315
38-40	122	218	316
41-43	135	219	317
44-46	132	220	318
47-49	145	221	-
50-52	123	222	-
53-55	124	223	316
56-58	125	224	-
59-61	127	226	317
62-64	141	227	-
65-67	133	229	318
68-70	126	230	-
71-73	118	231	-
74-76	116	237	-
77-79	115	238	-
80-83	108	208	311
84-87	113	212	310
88-91	129	248	307
92-95	148	244	308
96-98	167	242	-
99-00	101	241	-

T#	RANGE	TARGET	TORPS	ANG	TGT MOVE	ARRIVE



Salt Lake City (CA25)

UNITED STATES 1942 to 1943

2229-2 PENSACOLA Class

9,097 ts Displacement Complement Launched 01/23/1929 Completed


631 Length Beam 12/11/1929 Draft

570 ft 65 ft 19.5 ft

SHIP LOG SHEET

Version AOTF-Test060921






_					
10 x 8"/55 Mk 9-10	0	DIRECTORS			
		2			
ARCS OF FIRE	Range				
5	31,500 yds 63.0				
5 / 5	FC Radar		+ 2	2	
10	Mark	3 (F	:C)		


GUNNERY (FCS)									
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MED	NUIC	LONG				
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR			
0-9	21	13	15	10	12	8			
10-18	15	9	11	7	9	5			
19-26	12	8	9	6	7	4			
27-32	10	7	7 5		6	4			

34%	PENETRATION TABLE							
APCBC	SH	ORT	MEDIUM	LONG				
YDS	3,000	8,000	15,000	31,500				
ROF	7	6	4	2				
HORZ	0	1	1	3				
VERT	14 12		8	4				



GUNNERY (FCS)										
TARGET	SHO	ORT	MED	NUIC	LONG					
SPEED	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR	BRD	NAR				
0-9	16	10	12	7	9	6				
10-18	12	7	8	5	7	4				
19-26	10	6	7	4	5	3				
27-32	8	5	6	4	5	3				
	•									

18%	PENETRATION TABLE								
COM	SH	ORT	MEDIUM	LONG					
YDS	2,000	4,000	8,000	14,500					
ROF	7	7 6		2					
HORZ	0	0	0	1					
VERT	4	3	2	1					



T	ORPE	EDOE:	S
TT	0	RL	0

PROPULSION / MANEUVER										
Engine Rm	2	32	18	0	0	0	0		S	t
Prop/Shaft	4	32	28	16	4	0	0		60	
Boiler Rm	4	32	29	20	7	0	0		Em	
		•	0	0	0	0	0		90	

	LOSS OF SPEED DURING TURNS																		
KTS	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40
STD	3	5	6.	8	9	10	12	13	15	16	18	19	21	22	24	26	27	28	30
EMG	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

Std Turn

Emg Turn

	GUNNERY RECORD													
T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	L H			T#	RANGE	TARGET	RNDS	TBL	ŀ	1
	1		1				1		1					

arg Sz	Crew	S	ea		PROTECTION						HIT LOCATION						
1					ARMOR VALUE					Ī	RANGE	HORZ	VERT				
earchlights Port Stbd			HORIZONTAL		1		ĺ	SHORT	01-05	06-00							
ouroning	Jillo F	יונ	Sibu		VERTICAL 1						MEDIUM	01-19	20-00				
12 6 DAMAGE CONTROL (DCR)									LONG	01-39	40-00						
							_	Ť			1						

FL	.AG	CC	MI	1AN	ND	RA'	TIN	G (I	FCF	₹)

W2-02-4

			W2-02-4
	DAMAGE	DETERMINATION	I
ROLL	CLASS 1	CLASS 2	CLASS 3
01-02	100	202	304
03-04	128	201	302
05-06	102	203	303
07-08	103	205	301
09-10	109	210	305
11-13	104	200	306
14-16	106	246	-
17-19	107	206	-
20-22	105	207	310
23-25	114	211	-
26-28	111	213	312
29-31	121	214	313
32-34	144	215	314
35-37	171	217	315
38-40	165	218	-
41-43	135	219	317
44-46	132	220	-
47-49	145	221	-
50-52	123	222	-
53-55	124	223	-
56-58	125	224	-
59-61	127	226	-
62-64	146	227	-
65-67	133	229	318
68-70	126	230	-
71-73	118	231	305
74-76	116	237	-
77-79	115	238	-
80-83	108	208	319
84-87	113	212	320
88-91	129	248	307
92-95	151	244	308
96-98	163	242	310
99-00	101	241	316

T#	RANGE	TARGET	TORPS	ANG	TGT MOVE	ARRIVE



CATALOGUE OF FLAG SIGNALS

The individual cards comprising this catalog are meant to provide gamers a means to direct a fleet, squadron or division of warships on the game table at a flag command level. Many, but not all, of the signal flags and their corresponding interpretation were taken from the Royal Navy's <u>GENERAL SIGNAL BOOK</u>, 1915. Of course, it would require multiple decks of many cards in order to replicate the hundreds of signals and their many variations included in the 353 pages (plus addendums) of that book.

Consider the example of the following coded flag signal issued by Admiral Jellicoe to begin the deployment of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland:

Equal Speed South East by East (Equal Speed pendant, C flag, L flag)

The actual meaning of the "Equal Speed Charlie London" signal is translated according to the signal book as: "The column nearest SE by E is to alter course in succession to that point of the compass, the remaining columns altering course leading ships together, the rest in succession so as to form astern of the column, maintaining the speed of the fleet."

The Signal Cards in this catalog, while simplified for gaming purposes, are commensurate with the types of signals that might have been issued during any naval battle and, while they may not necessarily illustrate the actual flags or hoists used, do convey the intended meaning.

The deck is organized into six categories in order to simplify organizing your cards for play:

NUMERIC: Cards used to specify numeric values necessary for signals such as speed, course or bearing.

UNIT ID: Cards used to identify a specific unit (division, ship, squadron, flotilla, etc.).

BATTLE ORDER: Cards used to initiate a pre-determined battle order.

DIRECTION: Cards used to specify a particular direction necessary for certain signals.

MANEUVER: Cards used to initiate a particular maneuver or formation.

ACTION: Cards used during battle to direct gunfire and other aspects of the engagement.

FLEET ACTIONS 1880-1945

CARD IMAGE

ONE Indicates the numeral one (1) 100 NUMERIC 1

USAGE

DURATION: Used once in combination with any signal requiring a numeric value be specified.

DESCRIPTION: Used to convey a numeric value associated with an order, maneuver, direction or bearing (i.e. to communicate "Alter course to port 25 degrees", the cards would be 144, 126, 101, 104).

Repeater signals (150, 151) can be used when the desired numeric value requires two of the same numeral (i.e. to communicate "220", the cards would be: 101, 115, 109).

ID: 100 thru 109 TYPE: NUMERIC



DURATION: Used once in combination with any signal requiring a numeric value be specified.

DESCRIPTION: Used to convey a two-digit numeric value (10, 30, 45, 60, 90) associated with an order, maneuver, direction or bearing (i.e. to communicate "Alter course to port 45 degrees", the cards would be 144, 126, 112). Note that 144, 126, 103, 104 can also be used for the same signal.

ID: 110 thru 114 TYPE: NUMERIC



DURATION: Used once in combination with any signal requiring a numeric value be specified.

DESCRIPTION: Used to repeat the information communicated by the previous Signal Card. Repeater signals (115, 116) can be used when the desired numeric value requires two of the same numeral (i.e. to communicate "220", the cards would be: 101, 150, 109).

ID: 115 thru 116 TYPE: NUMERIC



DURATION: Used once in combination with an order or maneuver.

DESCRIPTION: Indicates the following signal is directed to the tactical unit 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 (ship, division, squadron or flotilla) as previously determined by the commanding flag officer.

ID: 117 thru 122 TYPE: UNIT ID



DURATION: Continuous until completed by all recipients or until order is cancelled

DESCRIPTION: Orders recipients to perform maneuvers necessary to execute a pre-determined Battle Order. Note that maneuvers associated with order may take several game turns to complete and may have unpredictable results if cancelled before completed.

Cancelling the order prior to completion will result in ships maintaining their course at the beginning of the MOVEMENT PHASE of the game turn in which the CANCEL (163) signal is made, unless additional orders are given for course changes in the same signal.

ID: 123 thru 125 **TYPE:** ORDER

FLEET ACTIONS 1880-1945

CARD IMAGE

BEARING/COMPASS Indicates the following Signal Card references a bearing or point of the compass District of the last 134 DIRECTION

USAGE

DURATION: Used once in combination with an order or maneuver.

DESCRIPTION: Indicates the following Signal Card references a bearing or point of the compass.



ID: 134 TYPE: DIRECTION

DURATION: Continuous until superseded by new order for change of speed

DESCRIPTION: Orders recipients to change or maintain the formation speed directed in this signal. Used to convey the desired speed for a formation and must be followed by cards designating a numeric value to indicate the speed in knots.

Signal can be cancelled (163) or superseded on a following game turn by any signal ordering a change in speed (i.e. 136).



ID: 135 TYPE: MANFUVFR

DURATION: Continuous until superseded by new order for change of speed

DESCRIPTION: Orders receiving ships to increase to their maximum capable speed, regardless of formation speed constraints or previous speed orders. Signal can be superseded on a following game turn by any signal ordering a change in speed (i.e. 135).



DURATION: Continuous until completed or cancelled

DESCRIPTION: Orders ships to begin a turn (to port or starboard) in the direction and number of degrees specified, following in the wake of the lead ship in the formation. Also known as a CORPEN TURN. This maneuver is considered complete when all ships in the formation are on the same course as the lead ship. Note that this maneuver is likely to take several game turns to complete and may have unpredictable results if cancelled before completed.

Cancelling the order prior to completion will result in ships maintaining their course at the beginning of the MOVEMENT PHASE of the game turn in which the CANCEL (163) signal is made, unless additional orders are given for course changes in the same signal.

See Diagram 6-2

TURN IN SUCCESION Orders ships to begin a turn (to port or starboard) in the direction and number of degrees specified, following in the wake of the lead ship 137 MANEUVER

ID: 137 TYPE: MANEUVER

TURN IN SUCCESION BY DIVISION Orders divisions to begin a turn in the direction and number of degrees specified, leading ships turning together

MANEUVER

ID: 138 TYPE: MANEUVER

138

DURATION: Continuous until completed or cancelled

DESCRIPTION: Orders lead ship of each division to begin a *turn together* (to port or starboard) in the direction and number of degrees specified, with the remaining ships of each division following in the wake of the lead ship of the division.

This maneuver differs from #137 in that it assumes the line is comprised of multiple divisions and is considered complete when all ships in all divisions are on the same course as the lead ship of the division. Note that this maneuver is likely to take several game turns to complete and may have unpredictable results if cancelled before completed.

Cancelling the order prior to completion will result in ships maintaining their course at the beginning of the MOVEMENT PHASE of the game turn in which the CANCEL (163) signal is made, unless additional orders are given for course changes in the same signal. See Diagram 6-1

